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This paper identifies factors associated with takeoff -- a sustained period of high growth following
a period of stagnation. We examine a panel of 241 "stagnation episodes" from 146 countries, 54 %
of these episodes are followed by takeoffs. Countries that experience takeoffs average 2.3% annual
growth following their stagnation episodes, while those that do not average 0% growth; 46% of the
takeoffs are "sustained," i.e. lasting 8 years or longer. Using probit estimation, we find that de jure
trade openness is positively and significantly associated with takeoffs. A one standard deviation increase
in de jure trade openness is associated with a 55% increase in the probability of a takeoff in our default
specification. We also find evidence that capital account openness encourages takeoff responses, although
this channel is less robust. Measures of de facto trade openness, as well as a variety of other potential
conditioning variables, are found to be poor predictors of takeoffs. We also examine the determinants
of nations achieving sustained takeoffs. While we fail to find a significant role for openness in determining
whether or not takeoffs are sustained, we do find a role for output composition: Takeoffs in countries
with more commodity-intensive output bundles are less likely to be sustained, while takeoffs in countries
that are more service-intensive are more likely to be sustained. This suggests that adverse terms of
trade shocks prevalent among commodity exports may play a role in ending long-term high growth
episodes.
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1. Introduction and overview 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to identify factors associated with growth acceleration from 
economic stagnation – a process dubbed by Rostow (1960) as Economic Takeoff.  Understanding 
economic takeoffs remains the cornerstone of macro development – closing the income/capita 
gaps between the poorer countries and the OECD may be predicated on their ability to transition 
towards higher growth rates, potentially leading to a “takeoff.”  Rostow (1960) was among the 
first to put stagnation and the transition to growth at the center of macro-development, 
articulating conditions leading to a takeoff.  He conjectured that economies evolves in stages – 
“The take-off is the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally 
overcome. The forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves 
of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal 
condition.”   
Despite the proliferation of cross country growth regressions and the recent studies on 
“miraculous” growth of emerging markets, empirical investigations of takeoffs have provided 
mixed results.  Easterly (2005) recently investigated takeoffs, using a benchmark definition of a 
takeoff as going from about zero growth (between -0.5 and 0.5 percents) to “permanent” stable 
positive per capita growth (above 1.5 percent).  He found that, examining the experience of 127 
countries, there are only 9 takeoffs, deducing that “The idea of the takeoff does not garner much 
support in the data.  Takeoffs are rare in the data, most plausibly limited to the Asian success 
stories.”  Instead, he concluded that “gradual accelerations” are more prevalent than takeoffs. 
Parente and Prescott (2005) offer a different perspective.  They take a political economy view of 
the obstacles to growth – “a country will catch up to the leading industrial countries only if it 
eliminates constraints preventing its adoption of leading technologies.  Removal of these   2
constraints is likely to meet resistance, as the constraints are typically constructed to protect 
specialized groups of factor suppliers and corporate interests.”
1   
Other explanations of stagnation in the literature suggest that factor endowments may 
inhibit adoption of leading technologies and result in stagnation. Basu and Weil (1998) develop a 
model where stagnation can result from emerging market countries possessing factor proportions 
too different from leader countries where technological innovation occurs. This leads 
technological innovations to be “inappropriate” for countries that are too far behind, so that 
divergence occurs. Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) introduce a model where insufficient 
endowments of human capital preclude technology adoption from advanced countries. Similarly, 
Easterly (2005) notes that a poverty trap could emerge in a Lucas-type (1988) model where low 
skill levels in the labor force might discourage new entrants into the labor force from acquiring 
higher skills. 
In a recent paper, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik [HPR (2005)] examine episodes of 
sustained rapid acceleration in economic growth.   They study a cross-country panel with 
potential acceleration dates ranging from 1957 through 1992. In contrast to the takeoff results for 
permanent takeoffs in Easterly, they find that episodes of sustained acceleration are quite 
frequent.  They identify more than 80 such acceleration episodes, with the unconditional 
probability that a country will experience a growth acceleration during a decade estimated to be 
at around 25%.  
                                                 
1 Applying Maddison’s data, they find evidence that late starters of takeoffs have been able to double their incomes 
in far shorter time periods compared to earlier starters.  For “early starters,” which are those achieving 10 percent of 
the 1985 U.S. GDP/Capita level before 1950, the median length of the time to double their GDP/Capita is 45 years. 
For “late starters,” defined as those achieving 10 percent of the 1985 U.S. level after 1950, the median length of the 
doubling period is 15 years. 
   3
HPR find that changes in the political regime, identified as a significant changes in a 
nation’s polity score [Marshall and Jaggers (2002)], the death of a national leader, or the end of a 
war, are important predictors of acceleration episodes. In contrast, they find economic reforms, 
proxied in their panel as transitions towards open trade policy using the Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003) update of the Sachs-Warner (1995) data set, have no significant impact on the probability 
of an acceleration.
2 They conclude that accelerations, while by no means rare, tend to be caused 
predominantly by idiosyncratic changes difficult to reconcile with country characteristics 
commonly associated with superior long-term growth in the literature.  
Our analysis identifies “takeoffs” as intermediate phenomena between Easterly’s more 
permanent takeoff definition, which revealed only 9 takeoffs in the experience of 127 countries  
(5 in the 44 country Maddison data set), and HPR’s measures of accelerations, which include 
already fast-growing nations – for example China in 1990, which accelerated from 4.2% to 8.0% 
growth - and identify 80 accelerations. We define takeoffs as transitions from stagnation to 
robust growth, where stagnations are defined as five-year periods with average real per capita 
GDP growth below 1% and significant growth is defined as experiencing a period of real per 
capita GDP growth exceeding 3% over a minimum of 5 years within 10 years of the stagnation 
period.  Of the 241 stagnation episodes in our full sample of 146 countries, 1950-2000, 54 % are 
followed within 10 years by takeoffs.  The average duration of takeoffs in our sample exceeds 9 
years.   Moreover, the takeoffs that we examine in our study are phenomena that merit interest. 
For example, countries that experienced takeoffs according the base definition in our study 
averaged 2.3% annual real per capita GDP growth from their stagnation episodes, while those 
                                                 
2 However, they found that economic reform is a statistically significant predictor of growth accelerations that are 
sustained. 
   4
that did not averaged 0% growth.
3  Average growth increases from -0.6% during stagnation 
episodes to 3.6% during takeoffs; 46% of the takeoffs are relatively “sustained,” i.e. lasting 8 
years or longer -- the fortunes of countries that either did or did not experience takeoff episodes 
are therefore markedly different.   
Our motivation for examining this intermediate type of takeoff is two-fold: First, relative 
to the growth accelerations studied by HPR, our definition reflects the view that the first step of 
the economic takeoff, from stagnation to growth, is likely to differ from an acceleration in a 
country that is already growing at a significant base.  This is consistent with Parente and 
Prescott’s and Rostow’s conjecture that the political economy transformation and the hurdles 
needed to overcome stagnation potentially differ from general growth accelerations. As such, 
there might be greater scope for economic policy to influence outcomes among these types of 
takeoffs.   
Second, we adopt a takeoff definition that is less stringent than that in Easterly because 
economic stagnations are themselves costly phenomena that merit attention. While we accept 
Easterly’s conjecture that permanent takeoffs from poverty traps are too rare to be systematically 
studied, our analysis below demonstrates that takeoffs of substantial duration from stagnation 
episodes are still relatively common. The data demonstrate that countries that exhibit these long 
periods of robust growth sometimes fall back into stagnation periods. While such a pattern might 
preclude the Easterly definition of a takeoff as a permanent increase to robust growth, it is still 
the case that welfare in the country is increased for having experienced the takeoff episode. As 
such, the determinants of takeoff episodes warrant attention.    
The methodology we adopt is inspired by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), 
refocusing on issues dealing with takeoffs.  Our baseline criterion for a takeoff is more stringent 
                                                 
3 These growth figures are calculated from the stagnation episode date to the end of the sample for each country.   5
than Easterly (2005) in terms of the post takeoff growth, but less stringent in terms of the 
duration of significant growth needed to be counted as a takeoff.  This reflects our conjecture 
that the capacity to takeoff may differ from the capacity to sustain such a takeoff.  It also implies 
that we may end up with more takeoffs than the one identified by Easterly (2005), some 
sustainable and some not.   Of course, the discrete definition of a takeoff episode is arbitrary, so 
we subject our findings to a battery of robustness tests.  
Our summary statistics below demonstrate that countries that do and do not experience 
takeoff episodes within 10 years of stagnation dates differ markedly in the degree of openness 
that their countries exhibited during their stagnation episodes. Episodes that yield positive 
takeoff responses have measurably higher levels of de jure and de facto trade openness, lower 
average tariff rates, and higher capital account openness. All of these differences are significant 
at least a 10% confidence level, with the difference in de jure openness being significant at a 1% 
confidence level.   Positive takeoff responses are measurably more likely to occur following the 
end of a war, among countries with higher average education levels in the population, and have 
measurably lower shares of commodities in their output bundles relative to GDP.  We then turn 
to parametric evidence, conducting probit estimation concerning the presence or absence of a 
takeoff within ten years of a stagnation episode.  de jure trade openness is again positively and 
significantly associated with takeoffs. We also find that capital account openness encourages 
takeoff responses, although this channel exhibits less robustness.   
In contrast to our results on the determinants of whether a takeoff occurs, we fail to find 
much of a role for openness in determining whether or not the takeoffs that countries experience 
are sustained.  We again conduct probit estimation over the set of takeoffs to examine the 
determinants of whether or not a takeoff was sustained, defined as equal to or exceeding eight   6
years in length. We find that takeoffs sustainability is harder to achieve for countries with high 
shares of commodities in their output bundle, but easier for countries with high shares of services 
in their output. This suggests that a commodity-intensive economy is more likely to suffer from 
swings in terms of trade that may forestall a high growth episode, while the service sector is 
likely to be more stable.    
The low explanatory power of our regressions concerning the duration of takeoffs does 
not negate the importance of our earlier results concerning the presence or absence of takeoffs, 
but it does suggest that more research is needed to understand the factors terminating takeoffs.  
Better understanding of these issues may require looking at non-linear interactions between 
shocks, social structures and institutions of conflict management, as Rodrik’s (1999) study of the 
growth collapse after the mid-1970s.   
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 overviews the parametric results.  Section 4 reviews the robustness 
checks.  Section 5 summarizes the determinants of sustained takeoffs, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
Our data is an unbalanced panel of 146 countries from 1950 through 2000. Based on our 
definition of stagnation episodes, outlined below, we end up with 114 countries with potential 
takeoff dates ranging from 1960 through 1995. 
Our main explanatory variables of interest are policy variables associated with national 
openness. We estimate our de jure measure of trade openness, de jure openness, using the update 
of the Sachs-Warner (1995) openness index constructed by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). This   7
variable takes value 1 during periods identified as open and 0 otherwise. As discussed in 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), the index considers not only trade openness, but also structural 
features such as the presence of marketing boards and socialist economic regimes. As such, we 
follow HPR  (2005) in interpreting a country’s score on this index as being indicative of broader 
economic reforms.
4 We estimate de facto openness in terms of exports plus imports over GDP, 
measured in local currency using IMF International Financial Statistics data. We also examine 
tariff averages, Avg. tariff rate, using the Dollar-Kraay (2004) data.
5  Finally, capital account 
openness, provides a de jure measure of capital account openness from Chinn and Ito (2006). 
  Data on national output and population was taken from the Penn World Tables. We use 
chain-weighted per capita GDP estimates. Output and population are measured in logs, lgdp and  
lpop respectively. These variables, combined with regional dummy variables, Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and OECD, form our base specification.
6 
We then subject our base specification to the addition of a number of alternative 
conditioning variables. We condition for changes in the net barter terms of trade using data from 
the World Development Indicators, or the IMF International Financial Statistics price indices of 
exports and imports for countries that are missing in our primary data source. Our measured 
                                                 
4 We measure de jure openness as whether a country is open or closed on the stagnation date. As such, the positive 
coefficient we obtain below suggests that holding all else equal, being open raises the likelihood of going from 
stagnation to takeoff. In contrast, HPR (2005) measure changes in de jure openness, concentrating on changes in the 
level of openness as indicators of reform. Our use of the level of openness treats countries that have been open for a 
long time equivalently to those that have just opened, but it distinguishes these countries from those that remain 
closed.   
  
5 Tariffs are measured as average tariff rates within 10 years of stagnation date.  
 
6 All OECD countries are classified as in OECD. Non-OECD Latin American and Caribbean countries are classified 
as in Latin America. Sub-Saharan African countries are classified as in Sub-Saharan Africa. Non-OECD South and 
East Asian countries are classified as in Asia, and remaining non-OECD countries are classified as in Other.  
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change in the terms of trade dTOT is then measured as the average percentage in the terms of 
trade measure over the five year period beginning in the current year.
7 
We condition for human capital average years of education in the population above the 
age of 25 from the Barro and Lee (1993) data set. 
Following HPR, we estimate political regime changes, regchange, as a three-unit change 
in the Marshall-Jaggers (2002) Polity IV data set. We also examine the Lead_Death political 
variable from the Jones and Olken (2005) data set, which takes value 1 if the country’s leader has 
died within the previous five years newly-deceased leader. We also use the War_End and 
Civil_War variables, from the Correlates of War (2002) data base. The former takes value 1 if 
there has been a cessation of conflict within the previous five years and 0 otherwise, while the 
latter takes value 1 if there has been an end of a civil war within the previous five years and 0 
otherwise. 
To condition for financial development, we examine the ratios of domestic credit, liquid 
liabilities, and cash to GDP, respectively named DomCredit, Liquid, and Money. Data is obtained 
from the World Development Indicators. 
Finally, we also condition for the overall structure of the economy, by introducing 
measures of manufacturing, commodities, and services as a share of GDP. These variables are 
labeled Manuf/GDP, Comm/GDP, and Serv/GDP respectively. Data for these variables was also 
obtained from the World Development Indicators. 
 
 
                                                 
7 To maximize the sample size, in cases where terms of trade data where unavailable in the initial year, but were 
available within four years of the initial year, we used terms of trade changes over the five year interval beginning in 
the first year for which data was available. This interval remains within the ten year interval over which we searched 
for takeoffs.   9
2.2 Takeoff Definitions   
  To examine takeoff episodes, we first identify dates during stagnation episodes where 
takeoffs can potentially occur. These dates are defined as the last year of a five-year interval 
where real per capita GDP growth is below 1.0%. It is therefore possible (and indeed occurs) that 
a country in our sample can have more than one potential takeoff date.  However, we don’t want 
potential takeoff dates to overlap across five-year episodes or occur during takeoffs. 
Consequently, we assume that for a country to have a second potential takeoff date, it must 
achieve at least moderate growth (above 1%) subsequent to the initial stagnation episode date. 
We also rule out potential takeoff dates during takeoff episodes, as defined below.  
  A takeoff is then defined as occurring if there is a consecutive five year interval of high 
growth (more than 3%) within ten years of the potential takeoff date. We are also interested in 
the determinants of the duration of takeoffs. We time the end of a takeoff episode as occurring in 
the first year where average growth since the start of the takeoff falls below 3%. The duration of 
a takeoff is then measured as the time from the first to last years of the high growth period. The 
full set of takeoffs and non-takeoffs in our sample are listed in the appendix. 
We understand that to some extent these values are arbitrary, so we subject our results 
below to a battery of robustness tests to ensure that our results are not driven by these definitions.  
 
2.3 Characteristics of Takeoffs: 
Summary statistics for takeoff episodes by region are shown in Table 1. The data reveal 
some interesting patterns: First, it can be seen that takeoff episodes are relatively common, 
similar to the findings for accelerations by HPR. Of the 241 stagnation episodes in our full 
sample, 54.4%, or 131 are followed within 10 years by takeoffs. Average growth increases from   10
-0.6% during stagnation episodes to 3.6%. 46.4% of the takeoffs in our sample meet our 
definition of being “sustained,” i.e. lasting 8 years or longer.  
The distribution of takeoffs is shown in Figure 1. There are a large number of takeoffs at 
or close to the minimum takeoff length of five years, but there are also a significant number of 
takeoffs of much longer duration, with three exceeding 30 years in duration.
8 The average 
duration of takeoffs in our sample exceeds 9 years.
9  
  The distribution of takeoffs across time in our sample is shown in Table 2. While there is 
a bit of clustering at the initial potential takeoff date, 1960, by and large the takeoffs are 
distributed relatively evenly across the sample.  
The breakdowns by region reveal a significant amount of heterogeneity at the regional 
level. The Sub-Saharan Africa region contains the greatest number of stagnation dates and 
exhibits the smallest share of stagnation dates followed by takeoffs (41.1%). The Asia and Other 
regions exhibit the highest takeoff percentages, at 70.8% and 88.5% respectively.
10 The OECD 
nations as a group also exhibit a relatively high incidence of takeoff (66.7%) suggesting that 
once a level of development is reached, countries are unlikely to become mired in very low 
growth episodes for significant periods of time before returning to robust growth. 
There are also notable differences in takeoff characteristics across regions. The Sub-
Saharan Africa region exhibited the smallest share of sustained takeoffs, with only 31.6% of 
                                                 
8 The three countries with takeoffs equal to or exceeding thirty years in duration are the Congo, Israel, and Morocco.  
 
9 There are also 41 takeoffs in our sample that last beyond the end of our data, precluding measurement of their 
duration. These takeoffs have lasted an average of 13.4 years by the end of our sample, so our estimate of average 
takeoff duration would be increased if these episodes could be included. Takeoffs are considered unsustained if we 
have data that demonstrates that the takeoff ended within eight years of its beginning and sustained if data exists that 
demonstrates that the takeoff lasted at least eight years. Takeoffs with missing data that precludes them from 
inclusion into either category are treated as missing in our examinations of takeoff sustainability below. 
 
10 Countries included in the “Other” region in our sample include Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Syria, and Tunisia.    11
takeoffs exceeding the 8 year threshold, while the Other region exhibited the highest share of 
sustained takeoffs at 76.5%. However, the Sub-Saharan African region exhibited the highest 
average growth during takeoff episodes, averaging around 3.8% during takeoff episodes, a major 
jump from the -0.8% average growth the observations from that region exhibit during stagnation 
episodes. 
Table 2 summarizes the differences in summary statistics for sub-samples of countries 
that do [dubbed positive] and do not experience [dubbed negative] takeoff episodes within 10 
years of stagnation dates. It can be seen that positive and negative takeoff responses differ 
markedly in the degree of openness that their countries exhibited during their stagnation episodes. 
Episodes that yield positive takeoff responses have measurably higher levels of de jure and de 
facto trade openness, lower average tariff rates, and higher capital account openness. All of these 
differences are significant at least a 10% confidence level, with the difference in de jure 
openness being significant at a 1% confidence level.  
Among the other explanatory variables, only three exhibit significant differences. 
Positive takeoff responses are measurably more likely to occur following the end of a war, 
among countries with higher average education levels in the population, and have measurably 
lower shares of commodities in their output bundles relative to GDP. All of these measurable 
differences appear to enter as one would predict. 
Whether or not a country responds to stagnation episode with a takeoff has significant 
implications for its subsequent growth experience.  Figure 3 displays the histograms of average 
growth rates subsequent to the stagnation date for countries that did and did not achieve takeoffs. 
These distributions are quite different, as countries that experienced takeoffs according the base   12
definition in our study averaged 2.3% annual growth following their stagnation episodes, while 
those that did not averaged 0.0% growth.  
 
3. Parametric results 
  To examine the relationship between openness and takeoffs more formally, we next turn 
to parametric evidence. Since the presence or absence of a takeoff within ten years of a 
stagnation date is a qualitative variable, we estimate our specifications using probit estimation 
with White’s heteroskedasticity correction. As we have some countries in our sample with more 
than one stagnation episode, we cluster our standard errors to allow for correlations by country. 
We also estimate our specifications with regional dummies to control for fixed effects by region. 
Our base specification also conditioning variables for GDP per capita and population, both 
measured in logs. 
  Our baseline parametric results are shown in Table 3. Models 1 through 4 introduce each 
openness measure one at a time. Model 5 introduces all four variables at once. It can be seen in 
Models 3 and 5 that the introduction of the average tariff variable results in a substantial 
reduction in our sample size. We therefore drop this variable in Model 6, which serves as our 
base specification.
11 
  Looking at the results as a whole, it is apparent that there is significant explanatory power 
associated with openness. De jure openness is particularly robust, consistently entering at a 1% 
confidence level with a coefficient estimate around 1. Our coefficient point estimate also 
suggests that the variable has economic significance. For example, given the variable’s standard 
                                                 
11 We also ran all of the specifications reported in Table 4 with the average tariff variable included as the openness 
measure.  This measure was fairly robust, usually entering at at least a 10% confidence level despite the reduced 
sample size. These regressions are available from the authors on request.   13
deviation of 0.45, a one standard deviation increase in de jure openness results in an increase in 
the probability of a takeoff of  55% in our default specification (Model 6). 
  In contrast to the de jure results, our de facto openness variable is constantly insignificant 
at standard levels, suggesting that de facto openness is a poor predictor of takeoffs. However, our 
other measure of de jure openness, average tariff levels, does enter marginally significant at 
exactly a 10% confidence level when entered on its own. Nevertheless, the variable is 
insignificant when introduced in a specification including our other openness measures. 
 Our  capital account openness measure is also statistically significant at at least a 10% 
confidence level in all three specifications in which it is included, with its predicted positive sign. 
Moreover, as was the case for the de jure openness variable, we also obtain an economically 
significant point estimate, as a one standard deviation increase in  capital account openness is 
predicted to result in a 29% increase in the probability of a takeoff.    
  Concerning our other regressors, the log of GDP tends to enter significantly negatively, 
with the exception of Model 3 with its reduced sample size. Population also usually receives a 
negative point estimate at statistically significant levels, again with the lone exception being a 
specification (Model 5) in which average tariff levels are introduced and the sample size is 
markedly smaller. Among the regional dummies, the Sub-Saharan Africa variable is robustly 
significant, which would be expected given our results above that showed this region as having 
the lowest takeoff incidence. The other regional dummies that exhibit robust results include Latin 
America, which is robustly negative at statistically significant levels, and the constant term, 
which reflects the Other regions and obtains a consistently positive coefficient estimate at 
statistically significant levels.    14
  Overall, our results strongly indicate that “policy matters” for takeoffs, in the sense that 
de jure measures of both trade and capital account openness were found to be positively 
associated with takeoffs after stagnation episodes at statistically and economically significant 
levels.  
 
4. Robustness checks. 
4.1 Additional conditioning variables 
  In this section, we subject our default specification to a variety of robustness checks. First, 
we introduce a variety of additional conditioning variables in Table 4. These include a measure 
of changes in the terms of trade; an indicator of years of schooling in the population; a measure 
of political regime change; indicators of political changes, such as being at the end of a civil or 
other war or the death of a national leader; indicators of levels of domestic financial development, 
and finally indicators of economic structure as measured by the share of manufactures, 
commodities and services. 
  Overall, our results for the openness policy variables are quite similar to those we 
obtained in our default specification. de jure openness enters at at least a 10% confidence level in 
all specifications with similar coefficient magnitudes to those obtained in Table 3. de facto 
openness continues to be insignificant. Capital account openness tends to enter significantly 
positive at at least a 10% confidence level, with the lone exception being Model 4, which 
introduces the War End, Civil War and Leader Death indicators of political changes.  
  For space reasons, coefficient estimates for the other regressors have not been reported.
12 
However, these results were largely similar to those reported in Table 3. The Sub-Saharan Africa 
dummy and the constant term reflecting the Other region again enter robustly at statistically 
                                                 
12 These estimates are available on request from the authors.   15
significant negative and positive coefficient estimates respectively. There was some reduction in 
the robustness of the lgdp and lpop variables, although these continue to tend to enter with 
negative coefficient estimates.  
  Concerning the additional conditioning variables, most are insignificant, with the 
exception of the regchange variable, which enters negatively at a 10% confidence level.  
 
4.2 Alternative samples 
Table 5 considers a number of different sample populations. For space considerations, we 
again suppress the coefficient estimates on the GDP and population variables, as well as the 
regional dummies, and concentrate on the coefficient estimates for the openness coefficient 
estimates of interest. To highlight the implications of sample changes, we run our default 
specification throughout. 
We first drop countries with large (greater than 100 million) and then small (less than 5 
million) populations. We next drop wealthy countries, those earning more than $20,000 in GDP 
per capita, and then drop poor countries, those earning less than $1,000 per capita. Finally, we 
drop each of the four regions from the sample one at a time. 
As before, the de jure openness variable is positive and significant at a 1% confidence 
level for all of the sample permutations, usually with a coefficient value around 1. The one 
exception is when we drop the countries in the Latin America region, which results in the 
variable losing its statistical significance, although it still enters with a point estimate of 0.77, 
which is also insignificantly different from 1. It is also noteworthy that we obtain a very large 
coefficient estimate of 2.33 when we drop the smaller countries below 5 million in population,   16
suggesting that the probability of a takeoff among the larger countries in our sample is quite 
sensitive to a countries openness policy. 
For all of the alternative samples we again fail to find a significant impact of de facto 
openness, except for the sub-sample which excludes the OECD countries. For this alternative 
sample, de facto openness enters negatively at a 10% confidence level. 
Capital account openness obtains a positive coefficient estimate for all of the alternative 
samples we consider. However, the estimate is only statistically significant at a 10% level for 
three of samples where one of the regions is dropped, the exception being when the OECD 
observations are dropped. Overall, the results are in keeping with the rest of our specifications, in 
that the capital account openness variable consistently enters with a positive coefficient estimate, 
but demonstrates less robustness than the de jure openness variable. 
 
4.3 Alternative takeoff definitions 
We next examine some perturbations of our takeoff definitions. First, we consider a 
stricter definition of stagnation episodes. As in Easterly (2005), we limit our stagnation episodes 
to those periods with growth below 0.5%. Second, we again follow Easterly by reducing the 
threshold for takeoff episodes to growth periods exceeding 1.5%. Finally, we consider a tighter 
definition of takeoffs, only considering growth episodes which average over 4% growth in real 
per capita GDP over five years as takeoff episodes. 
We then increase the minimum duration of takeoff episodes to eight years, the time 
period considered by HPR. We first examine takeoffs and stagnation episodes with the same 
parameters as those above, so that only the minimum takeoff duration is changed. Next, we   17
examine the combination of the perturbations considered above with minimum eight year takeoff 
durations. In all, Table 6 examines 7 alternative takeoff definitions. 
Our primary openness measure de jure openness, consistently enters with a positive 
coefficient estimate at or above 1 at at least a 5% confidence level for all specifications except 
the final one, which considers minimum eight year takeoff episodes averaging at least 4% 
growth. This is the most restrictive takeoff definition, and as such results in the fewest 
designated takeoff episodes. 
The de facto openness variable still tends to enter insignificantly with a negative point 
estimate, with the exception of the specification with stagnation episodes limited to five-year 
periods below 0.5% average growth where it enters at a 5% significance level. However, this is 
the only specification in our study in which this variable is significant, so we still consider this 
result very fragile. 
The capital account openness variable is insignificant throughout the seven alternative 
specifications, entering with a positive point estimate for all but the final specification, the one 
with eight year minimum takeoff episodes exceeding 4% in average growth. 
 
5. Determinants of sustained takeoffs 
  This section examines the determinants of sustained takeoffs, defined as those lasting at 
least eight years at high average growth rates. We examine a qualitative specification based on 
the set of observations that yielded positive takeoff responses. As such, our samples are much 
smaller than those in the main portion of the study. To compensate for this, we introduce only 
one conditioning variable at a time.    18
  Our results are shown in Table 7. It can be seen that our openness variables do not seem 
to be robust predictors of whether or not takeoffs will be sustained. The de jure openness 
variable usually enters with a positive point estimate, but is only statistically in one of the eight 
specifications reported (Model 3). The de facto openness variable is insignificant, as it was 
generally for the takeoff response specifications above. However, the most interesting change is 
that the capital account openness variable now tends to enter negatively, and usually (but not 
always) at statistically significant levels. This provides some support for the contention that open 
capital accounts can be associated with greater output growth volatility, as countries with open 
capital accounts in our sample appears to be less likely to experience sustained takeoffs 
conditional on the occurrence of a takeoff. 
  The conditioning variables tend to enter insignificantly, but there are some notable 
exceptions. The regchange variable enters negatively at a 5% confidence level, suggesting that 
takeoffs that take place after political regime changes tend to be of shorter duration than those 
that do not. The domestic credit variable enters positively at a 10% confidence level, providing 
some evidence that sustained takeoffs are associated with more developed domestic financial 
systems. 
  However, the most interesting results among the conditioning variables concern the 
proxies for the composition of the country output bundle. Because we were particularly 
interested in this variable for the determinants of the presence or absence of a sustained takeoff, 
we introduced the three variables considered above one at a time.
13 Two of the composition 
variables, the share commodities and the share of services, enter at least a 5% confidence level, 
with commodities entering negatively and services entering positively. These signs are intuitive 
                                                 
13 When the three variables are introduced simultaneously, all enter insignificantly, but this is probably attributable 
to the small sample with this specification (45 observations) and the high correlations among thes output share 
measures.   19
if one thinks that a commodity-intensive economy is more likely to suffer from swings in terms 




  This paper examines the characteristics of nations that experience takeoffs, long periods 
of high growth subsequent to stagnation episodes. Given the marked difference in growth 
experiences countries exhibited subsequent to their stagnation episodes depending on whether or 
not they achieved a takeoff, the determinants to such takeoffs are of important policy concern. 
Our results indicate that policy clearly does matter in determining whether or not 
countries move from low growth episodes to takeoffs, with de jure trade openness policies 
playing a prominent role in determining whether or not a takeoff occurs. We also found some 
evidence that capital account openness encouraged takeoff responses, although this channel 
exhibited less robustness.  
We failed to find much of a role for openness policy in determining whether or not 
countries experienced sustained takeoffs, conditional on a takeoff having occurred. However, we 
did find some role for economic structure. Countries with output bundles that were more 
commodity-intensive exhibited a smaller share of sustained takeoffs, while those that were more 
service-intensive exhibited a greater share of sustained takeoffs. This analysis suggests that 
adverse terms of trade shocks prevalent among commodity exports may play a role in ending 
long-term high growth episodes. 
  The results in our study re-raise the question of what is the meaning of a takeoff episode. 
We obtained different results than some of the previous literature in part because of the   20
difference in takeoff definitions used in our study. We do not intend to suggest that our definition 
is superior; in many ways we are measuring different phenomena than, for example, the 
permanent takeoffs studied by Easterly (2005). Still, as we discussed in the introduction, the 
takeoffs that we examine in our study are important phenomena that merit interest. Countries that 
experienced takeoffs in our study averaged 2.3% growth following their stagnation episodes, 
while those that did not averaged 0.0% growth. Regardless of the fact that the definition of a 
takeoff episode is somewhat arbitrary, then, these are certainly phenomena that merit attention. 
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Note: Histogram of measurable durations of takeoffs in sample. The average of takeoffs of 
measurable duration exceeds 9 years, but there are also 41 takeoffs in our sample that last 
beyond the end of our data, precluding measurement of their duration. These takeoffs have lasted 
an average of 13.4 years by the end of our sample, so our estimate of average takeoff duration 
would be increased if these episodes could be included.   24
Figure 2 
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Note: Histogram of takeoffs by year. Total of 131 takeoffs out of 241 stagnation dates.    25
Figure 3 
Growth of Takeoff and Non-takeoff countries 
 
 
Note: Histograms of average growth rates from stagnation date to end of sample for samples of 
countries which did and did not exhibit takeoffs. Sample includes 131 stagnation episodes that 
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Table 1 















241 107 24  57  26  27 
Number of 
takeoffs  131 44 17  29 23  18 
Takeoff 




(takeoff > 8 yrs.) 









-0.6% -0.8%  -0.04% -0.1% -1.9%  0.5% 
Average Growth 
During Takeoff  3.6% 3.8% 3.5% 3.4% 3.5%  3.3% 
 
Note: Table lists number of stagnation episodes and takeoffs by region. See text for 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics: Takeoffs vs. Non-Takeoffs 
Conditioning Variables  TO = 0  TO=1  DIFF 
















































































































Note: Table compares summary statistics for sub-samples of countries that do and do not experience takeoff 
episodes within 10 years of stagnation dates. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; and *** 
significant at 1% level.       28
Table 3 
Openness and Takeoffs 
 
Dependent variable: Realization of a takeoff 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
         
6.978*** 7.296*** 6.762** 9.000*** 11.641* 11.032***  constant 
(1.931) (2.072) (3.274) (2.583) (6.224)  (3.148) 
         
0.812***  -- -- --  1.395***  1.222***  de jure openness 
(0.299)      (0.471)  (0.411) 
         
-- 0.062 --  -- -0.428  -0.565  de facto openness 
 (0.373)    (0.835)  (0.445) 
         
-- -- --  0.181*  0.563**  0.229*  capital account 
openness      (0.109)  (0.263)  (0.122) 
         
-- --  -0.024  --  -0.023  --  Avg. tariff rate 
   (0.015)  (0.016)   
         
-0.453*** -0.367**  -0.259  -0.588**  -1.007**  -0.656**  lgdp 
(0.163) (0.169) (0.296) (0.233) (0.512)  (0.293) 
         
-0.142** -0.195** -0.194**  -0.197***  -0.110  -0.282***  lpop 
(0.065) (0.087) (0.099) (0.074) (0.173)  (0.108) 
         
-1.300*** -1.306*** -1.172**  -1.089**  -0.757  -1.047**  Latin America 
(0.387) (0.342) (0.569) (0.442) (0.721)  (0.463) 
         
-1.906*** -1.975*** -1.817** -2.097***  -2.455**  -2.061***  Sub-Saharan 
Africa  (0.455) (0.422) (0.798) (0.523) (1.244)  (0.629) 
         
-0.835*  -0.498 0.510 -0.111 0.452  0.433  Asia 
(0.470) (0.499) (0.984) (0.558) (1.321)  (0.699) 
         
-0.611 -0.277 -0.588 0.097 -1.377 -0.815  OECD 
(0.495) (0.453) (0.756) (0.544) (1.207)  (0.657) 
         
Observations  227 187 70 145 57  120 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.14 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.34  0.23 
 
Notes: Probit estimation with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 4 
Additional Conditioning Variables 
Dependent variable: Realization of a takeoff 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
    
7.78* 12.03*** 9.92*** 10.91*** 11.36***  11.69*** constant 
(4.09)  (4.09) (3.10) (3.66) (3.14)  (4.16)
    
1.03** 1.20*** 1.18*** 0.85* 1.33*** 1.24*** de jure openness 
(0.43)  (0.42) (0.39) (0.43) (0.44)  (0.43)
    
-0.43 -0.54 -0.47 -0.85 -0.27 -0.60 de facto openness 
(0.69)  (0.52) (0.47) (0.62) (0.67)  (0.45)
    
0.31* 0.23* 0.26** 0.22 0.28** 0.22* capital account 
openness (0.17)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.13)
    
-0.22 -- -- -- --  -- dTOT 
(0.75)  
    
-- 0.07 -- -- --  -- Years of schooling 
  (0.11)  
    
-- -- -0.63* -- -- -- regchange 
  (0.34)  
    
-- -- -- -0.57 -- -- Civil_War 
  (0.79)  
    
-- -- -- 0.07 -- -- War_End 
  (0.41)  
    
-- -- -- -0.02 -- -- Lead_Death 
  (0.53)  
    
-- -- -- -- 0.01  -- DomCredit 
  (0.01) 
    
Liquid  -- -- -- -- -0.001  --
    (0.03) 
    
-- -- -- -- -0.02  -- Money 
  (0.03) 
    
-- -- -- -- --  -0.55 Comm/GDP 
   (2.88)
    
-- -- -- -- --  1.06 Manuf/GDP 
   (3.74)
    
-- -- -- -- --  0.41 Serv/GDP 
   (2.78)
    
Observations 87  102 120 109 104  149
Pseudo R-squared 0.22  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24  0.18
 
Note: Probit estimation with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables 
included in specification but not reported: lgdp, lpop, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, OECD. * 
indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; and *** significant at 1% level.   




Dependent variable: Realization of a takeoff 
 
Note:   Probit estimation with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables 
included in specification but not reported: lgdp, lpop, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, OECD. * 
indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; and *** significant at 1% level.   
For space considerations we suppress the coefficient estimates on the GDP and population variables, as 
well as the regional dummies, and concentrate on the coefficient estimates for the openness coefficient 








openness  # obs.  Pseudo 
R
2 
        
1.22*** -0.56  0.23*  120  0.23  Base Regression 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.12)    
         
1.20*** -0.55  0.20 115  0.21  Drop countries with 
population > 100m  (0.41) (0.44) (0.13)    
         
2.33*** 0.38  0.12 76  0.45  Drop countries with 
population < 5m  (0.63) (1.01) (0.20)    
         
1.21*** -0.46  0.19 116  0.23  Drop countries > 20k 
GDP per capita  (0.42) (0.46) (0.13)    
         
1.01** -0.25  0.20 99  0.29  Drop countries < 1k 
GDP per capita  (0.44) (0.52) (0.12)    
         
0.77 -0.56 0.07  87  0.22  Drop Latin America 
(0.49) (0.61) (0.17)    
         
1.49*** -0.84  0.27**  74  0.22  Drop Sub-Saharan 
Africa  (0.51) (0.64) (0.13)    
         
1.19*** -0.53  0.22*  111  0.19  Drop Asia 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.12)    
         
1.20*** -0.84*  0.25  101  0.28  Drop OECD 
(0.45) (0.44) (0.16)    
         
1.52*** -0.16  0.27**  107  0.24  Drop Other 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.13)      31
 
Table 6 







Note: Probit estimation with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables 
included in specification but not reported: lgdp, lpop, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, OECD. * 
indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; and *** significant at 1% level. 








openness  # obs.  Pseudo 
R
2 
2.03*** -1.33**  0.19  111  0.24  Stagnation episodes 
below 0.5%   (0.53) (0.62) (0.14)    
         
1.05** 0.43  0.21  121  0.19  Takeoff episodes above 
1.5%   (0.50) (0.53) (0.13)    
         
0.90** -0.59  0.03  112  0.15  Takeoff episodes above 
4%  (0.45) (0.44) (0.13)    
         







openness  # obs.  Pseudo 
R
2 
1.52*** -0.80  0.15 109  0.11  Base Regression 
(0.54) (0.62) (0.13)    
         
1.47*** -1.04  0.21 109  0.23  Stagnation episodes 
below 0.5%   (0.57) (0.69) (0.13)    
         
1.38*** -0.77  0.15 113  0.35  Takeoff episodes above 
1.5%   (0.41) (0.57) (0.15)    
         
1.01 -0.29 -0.05  109  0.24  Takeoff episodes above 
4%  (0.62)  (0.69) (0.15)   
           32
 
Table 7 
Determinants of Sustained Takeoffs 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
-1.37 -0.82 -4.58 -1.08 -0.17  9.05  -1.25  0.26  constant 
(5.13) (7.71) (6.81) (4.94) (5.91)  (7.30)  (5.08) (5.56) 
          
0.94 1.19  1.53**  0.92 0.92 0.65 0.84 1.01  de jure openness 
(0.74) (1.00) (0.76) (0.81) (0.71)  (0.86)  (0.72) (0.78) 
          
0.64 1.12 0.21 0.57 0.81 -0.21 0.68 0.05  de facto openness 
(0.97) (1.71) (0.97) (0.98) (1.07)  (1.03)  (0.97) (1.02) 
          
-0.33**  -0.43 -0.23 -0.31*  -0.44** -0.20 -0.33**  -0.34**  capital account 
openness  (0.16) (0.28) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)  (0.15)  (0.16) (0.15) 
          
--  1.42  -- -- -- -- -- --  dTOT 
  ( 0 . 9 9 )         
-- --  -0.22  -- --  --  -- --  Years of schooling 
   (0.15)       
          
-- -- --  -0.97**  --  --  -- --  regchange 
    ( 0 . 4 9 )         
          
-- -- -- --  0.02*  --  -- --  DomCredit 
     ( 0 . 0 1 )       
          
-- -- -- -- --  -9.25***  -- --  Comm/GDP 
      ( 2 . 7 3 )     
          
-- -- -- -- --  --  2.06  --  Manuf/GDP 
        ( 2 . 7 4 )    
          
-- -- -- -- --  --  --  4.70**  Serv/GDP 
          ( 2 . 3 4 )  
          
Observations  45 27 39 45 44 45 45 45 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.17 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.21 
 
Note: Probit estimation with clustering by country and robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables 
included in specification but not reported: lgdp, lpop, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, OECD. * 
indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level; and *** significant at 1% level.    
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APPENDIX: Data Sources (Mnemonics in parentheses where available) 
 
Penn World Table Mark 6.2 (http://www.pwt.econ.upenn.edu): 
 
•  Real GDP using the chain rule (rgdpch) 
•  Population (pop) 
 
World Development Indicators (http://www.worldbank.org/data): 
 
•  Net Barter Terms of Trade 
•  Domestic Credit/GDP 
•  Liquid Liabilities/GDP 
•  Money/GDP 
•  Educational Attainment 
 
International Financial Statistics (http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/about.asp): 
 
•  Export Price Index (???) 
•  Import Price Index (???) 
 
Polity IV Project Data Set (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity) 
 
•  Polity2 (polity2)  
•   
Years of schooling 
 
•  Barro and Lee (1993) 
 
Average Tariff Rates 
 
•  Dollar and Kraay (2004) 
 
Periods of openness (http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/liberalization.xls): 
 
•  Wacziarg and Welch (2003) 
 
Leader Death  
 
•  Jones and Olken (2005) 
 
Tenure 
•  Jones and Olken (2005) 
 
War End  (http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/09905.xml) 
   34
•  Singer and Small, Correlates of War International and Civil War Database (2003)  
 
Civil War (http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/09905.xml) 
 
•  Singer and Small, Correlates of War International and Civil War Database (2003)  
 
Capital Account Openness (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/kaopen_2005.xls) 
 
•  Chinn and Ito (2006)   35
Appendix 2: Takeoffs in our sample 
 
Country  Stagnation year Start of takeoff End of takeoff Takeoff duration  
Algeria 1970 1972 1987 16
Antigua 1995 1996  5† 
Argentina 1963 1964 1974 11
Bangladesh 1979 1981 1986 6
Bangladesh 1989 1990 1998 9
Barbados 1984 1985 1994 10
Barbados 1995 1996  5† 
Belarus 1995 1996  5† 
Belgium 1985 1986 1990 5
Belize 1985 1986 1997 12
Bolivia 1960 1962 1967 6
Bolivia 1968 1971 1977 7
Botswana 1965 1966  34† 
Burkina Faso  1972 1974 1979 6
Burundi 1980 1984 1988 5
Cameroon 1965 1971 1975 5
Canada 1960 1961 1981 21
Canada 1982 1983 1989 7
Canada 1991 1996  5† 
Cape Verde  1965 1966 1973 8
Cape Verde  1974 1975  26† 
Chad 1982 1984 1989 6
Chile 1973 1976 1981 6
Chile 1983 1984  17† 
China 1961 1962 1967 6
China 1971 1975  26† 
Congo, Republic of  1967 1968 1998 31
Costa Rica  1963 1968 1974 7
Cyprus 1960 1961 1974 14
Cyprus 1975 1976  21† 
Denmark 1981 1982 1986 5
Dominican Republic  1965 1966 1984 19
Dominican Republic  1986 1991  10† 
Ecuador 1966 1968 1986 19
Egypt 1974 1975  26† 
 
Note: Countries not appearing in this table either did not experience stagnation episodes in our 
sample, or experienced stagnations episodes, but not takeoffs.  The later group is listed in 
Appendix 3 as non takeoff.  
 
† indicates takeoffs that did not end prior to end of sample for that country. Takeoff duration 
reported for countries with ongoing takeoffs at end of sample indicates length of duration up to 
the sample end. Stagnation year corresponds to last year of stagnation episode.    36
Appendix 2: Takeoffs in our sample 
(continued) 
Country  Stagnation year Start of takeoff End of takeoff Takeoff duration 
El Salvador  1960 1961 1967 7 
Equatorial Guinea  1965 1970 1974 5 
Ethiopia 1991 1993 8† 
Fiji 1965 1966 1982 17 
Fiji 1983 1988 1994 7 
Finland 1978 1979 1990 12 
Finland 1992 1994  7† 
Gabon 1981 1986 1991 6 
Gambia, The  1979 1980 1984 5 
Ghana 1960 1966 1976 11 
Greece 1990 1996  5† 
Grenada 1994 1995  6† 
Guinea-Bissau 1966 1971 1979 9 
Guinea-Bissau 1980 1981 1985 5 
Guinea-Bissau 1986 1987 1991 5 
Guinea-Bissau 1992 1993 8† 
Guyana 1960 1964 1972 9 
Guyana 1992 1993  7† 
Haiti 1972 1976 1980 5 
Honduras 1970 1975 1981 7 
Hungary 1990 1996  5† 
Iceland 1960 1961 1967 7 
Iceland 1969 1970 1991 22 
Iceland 1992 1994  7† 
India 1966 1967 1971 5 
India 1974 1980  21† 
Indonesia 1965 1966  35† 
Iran 1987 1989  12† 
Israel 1967 1968 1997 30 
Jordan 1969 1972 1989 18 
Kenya 1961 1962 1967 6 
Kenya 1970 1971 1982 12 
Korea, Republic of  1960 1961  40† 
Latvia 1995 1996  5† 
Lesotho 1969 1970 1974 5 
Lesotho 1990 1996  5† 
Luxembourg 1977 1982  19† 
Malawi 1960 1962 1967 6 
Malawi 1970 1971 1981 11 
Malawi 1994 1995  6† 
Malaysia 1986 1987  14† 
Mali 1973 1974 1979 6 
Mali 1993 1995  6† 
Mauritius 1960 1961 1967 7   37
Appendix 2: Takeoffs in our sample 
(continued) 
 
Country  Stagnation year Start of takeoff End of takeoff Takeoff duration 
Mauritius 1968 1970  31† 
Mexico 1995 1996  5† 
Morocco 1960 1961 1992 32 
Mozambique 1966 1967 1973 7 
Mozambique 1993 1996  5† 
Nepal 1980 1981 1985 5 
New Zealand  1968 1969 1974 6 
Nicaragua 1960 1961 1970 10 
Nigeria 1965 1967 1971 5 
Norway 1991 1992 1998 7 
Pakistan 1960 1961 1976 16 
Panama 1976 1977 1986 10 
Panama 1987 1990 1994 5 
Papua New Guinea  1970 1971 1975 5 
Papua New Guinea  1988 1989 1994 6 
Peru 1961 1962 1975 14 
Philippines 1992 1993 1997 5 
Poland 1984 1985 1989 5 
Poland 1990 1992  9† 
Portugal 1978 1984 1994 11 
Romania 1980 1981  20† 
Rwanda 1965 1966 1970 5 
Rwanda 1974 1975 1983 9 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 1980 1981 1985 5 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  1986 1987 10† 
Seychelles 1965 1966  35† 
Sierra Leone  1967 1968 1972 5 
Sierra Leone  1973 1979 1984 6 
Slovak Republic  1992 1993 1999 7 
Slovenia 1995 1996  5† 
Spain 1979 1985 1991 7 
Sri Lanka  1974 1979 1986 8 
Syria 1967 1968 1972 5 
Syria 1977 1978 1988 11 
Syria 1989 1990  11† 
Tanzania 1980 1983 1987 5 
Togo 1971 1972 1976 5 
Trinidad &Tobago  1971 1972 1985 14 
Trinidad &Tobago  1992 1995  6† 
Tunisia 1989 1994  7† 
Turkey 1962 1963 1978 16 
Turkey 1980 1983 1988 6   38
 Appendix 2: Takeoffs in our sample 
(continued) 
 
Country  Stagnation year Start of takeoff End of takeoff Takeoff duration 
Uganda 1973 1979 1984 6 
Uganda 1986 1990  11† 
United Kingdom  1981 1982 1989 8 
United States  1960 1961 1969 9 
United States  1982 1983 1990 8 
Uruguay 1974 1975 1981 7 
Uruguay 1983 1985 1989 5 
Venezuela 1961 1962 1967 6 
Zimbabwe 1962 1963 1967 5 
Zimbabwe 1977 1979 1983 5   39
Appendix 3: Non-takeoffs in our sample 
Year corresponds to last year of stagnation episode. 
 
 
Country  Year   Country  Year    Country   Year
Algeria 1988  Gambia,  The  1970 Paraguay  1966
Angola 1974  Gambia,  The  1986 Paraguay  1984
Argentina 1976  Ghana  1977 Peru  1978
Argentina 1981  Ghana  1983 Philippines  1984
Australia 1982  Ghana  1990 Rwanda  1984
Bangladesh 1964  Greece 1981 Senegal  1965
Benin 1964  Guatemala  1983 Senegal  1977
Benin 1969  Guinea  1964 Senegal  1984
Benin 1982  Guinea  1979 Sierra  Leone  1985
Benin 1989  Guyana  1979 South  Africa  1978
Bolivia 1980  Haiti  1982 South  Africa  1985
Brazil 1982  Honduras  1961 Sri  Lanka  1960
Brazil 1990  Honduras  1983 Sri  Lanka  1965
Burkina Faso  1964  Iran  1975 Sweden  1978
Burkina Faso  1981  Jamaica  1975 Switzerland  1975
Burkina Faso  1987  Jordan  1990 Switzerland  1985
Burundi 1975  Kenya  1983 Tanzania  1975
Cameroon 1988  Lesotho  1983 Tanzania  1988
Central African Republic  1965  Madagascar  1965 Togo  1977
Central African Republic  1971  Madagascar  1973 Togo  1985
Chad  1965  Malawi  1982  Trinidad&Tobago  1986
Chad 1990  Mali  1965 Uganda  1960
Colombia 1960  Mali  1981 Uganda  1967
Colombia 1983  Mauritania  1973 Uruguay  1960
Comoros 1972  Mauritania  1979 Venezuela  1969
Comoros 1983  Mexico  1984 Zambia  1969
Comoros 1990  Mozambique  1974 Zambia  1977
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1960  Namibia  1980 Zimbabwe  1985
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1967  Nepal  1965   
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1972  Nepal  1971   
Costa Rica  1981  Netherlands  1981   
Costa Rica  1989  New Zealand  1977   
Cote d`Ivoire  1980  New Zealand  1989   
Denmark 1975  Nicaragua  1971   
Ecuador 1987  Nicaragua  1979   
El Salvador  1971  Niger  1966   
El Salvador  1980  Niger  1980   
Equatorial Guinea  1976  Nigeria  1975   
Ethiopia 1960  Nigeria  1981   
Ethiopia 1974  Papua  New  Guinea  1977   
Ethiopia 1984  Paraguay  1960   
 